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Abstract
Questions of validity are not questions of nature, but rather emerge from the 
conditions of constitution of the anthropological potentials and subjectivity of the 
embodied-human subject. Through the body as coping-mastery, the lifeworld of 
humans is both socially and technically signed. Essential for an analysis of 
intersubjectivity is a threefold hermeneutics of the other as natural, artificial and 
human. The human lived body is a special case, in which all three dimensions of this 
hermeneutics are incorporated. Hence, the body can serve as a model for 
intersubjectivity.
Heidegger’s ontological evaluation of practical rationality (praktische Vernunft) is not
unproblematic.  It  leads to a certain  marginalization of theoretical  and practical  rationality
(Vernunft). Therefore, supplements are needed. (Figal 2006, 25-57). Among these, first and
foremost,  would be a “thesis of handling” (“Umgangsthese”).  The development of such a
thesis  requires  the  development  of  a  phenomenological  conception  of  intersubjectivity.
Questions of validity (Geltungsfragen) are not questions of nature, but rather emerge - within
the  post-phenomenological  perspective  -  from  the  questions  regarding  the  conditions  of
constitution of the anthropological potential and subjectivity of the embodied-human subject.
Corresponding to my thesis, through being-body (Leibsein) as “coping-mastery” (Umgehen-
Können),  the  Lifeworld  (Lebenswelt)  of  humans  is  both  social  and  technically  formed.
Essential for an analysis of Intersubjectivity is a threefold hermeneutics of “the other” (der
Andere) as nature, artificial and human. The human (lived) body (Leib) is a special case, in
which all three dimensions of this hermeneutics are incorporated. Hence, the body can serve
as a model for Intersubjectivity. 
From Intersubjectivity to the Hermeneutics of “Other Intelligences”  
In  the  phenomenology  of  Husserl,  intersubjectivity  is  the  term  for  all  forms  of
togetherness of multiple transcendental or mundane egos (Iche). This togetherness, is rooted
in  a  collectivisation,  which  comes  from transcendental  Ego  (Ich).  The  archetype  of  this
collectivisation is the encounter of the other, which means the constitution of the first not-I or
other.  The  constitutive  course  of  the  not-I  (Nicht-Ich)-experience  leads  us  from  the
collectivisation of the transcendental Monads (Monaden) to the all-Monads and from their
mundane objectivation to the constitution of the world for everyone. For Husserl, this world is
the  actual  objective  world  (Heldt  1976,  521).  Shaun  Gallagher  talks  about  pragmatic
intersubjectivity (Gallagher 1996) and takes a first step in my direction, because he interprets
personal  intersubjectivity,  from the  2nd-person-perspective.  By  the  time  children  start  to
integrate actions in pragmatic contexts, they achieve some sort of second intersubjectivity.
Approximately at the age of one, children are able to go beyond direct and immediate person-
person-relation of primordial intersubjectivity, leave it and capture other contexts.    
In  his  treatise  “The  Philosopher  and  His  Shadow”  Merleau-Ponty  outlines  the
philosophy  of  the  (lived)  body  (Leib).  His  assumption  is  that  there  is  an  objective
interpretational  dilemma  when  it  comes  to  the  arbitrary,  accidental  or  ambiguous.  This
dilemma is closely linked to the philosophy of the body (Leib). To comprehend the body in
the Husserlian sense, we need a reduction that leaves the natural attitude behind. The natural
attitude  refers  to  the  human  body in a  way opposed to  nature.  Furthermore,  we need an
attitude with regard to  the body,  which implies  a  certain  relation  between nature and the
human mind (Merleau-Ponty 1960, 202-205).  My body is  integrated  in the visible  world.
Aside from that, my body is able to feel,  for instance,  my right hand. In this process the
(lived)  body  (Leib)  is  perceived.  The  body  is  characterized  by  its  fleshy  texture,  and
respective structure. But the human being can become an alter ego for others as well. In this
respect he/she is not just flesh (Merleau-Ponty 1960, 215). 
Important for the body (Leib) is the co-presence of my consciousness and my body
(Körper). This body extends to the bodies beyond me, i. e. into intersubjectivity.  For this,
empathy is needed (Merleau-Ponty 1960, 220f.). Within the spectacle of the world, I have to
find means to gather my thoughts and make them a piece of my life (Merleau-Ponty 1960,
224). Whether with or against his will, Husserl is revealing a wild world and mind. Things
can only be understood from perspectivity, as the Renaissance illustrated fairly well. There
emerges a projective world according to requirements of a panorama. This baroque world is
not merely the minds concession to nature. Rather this world is rediscovered by the mind,
namely pure mind without affection from culture. In fact, this pure mind has to build a new
culture. The non-relative however, is neither given by nature itself, nor by the absolute mind’s
systems. It  is grounded in Being (Sein),  which precedes the human (Merleau-Ponty 1960,
228).
The heterophenomenology of other  humans is  indeed based on the second-person-
perspective  (2  pp).  While  heterophenomenology  of  other  intelligences,  namely  the
intelligence  of  animals  and  machines,  is  a  result  of  the  third-person-perspective  (3  pp).
Therefore, it is not right to call it heterophenomenology. Instead, next to a phenomenology of
other  humans,  we  should  develop  a  phenomenology  of  other  non-human  intelligences.
Dennett’s differentiation between a phenomenology of the “I” and a phenomenology of others
misses the self-conception of phenomenology. Phenomenological inquiries on the presence of
others  turn  against  the  illegitimate  occlusions  of  Cartesian  philosophy  of  consciousness,
which  created  the  problem of  foreign  psyche.  Wittgenstein  pointed  out  already,  that  the
everyday speech provides  no clue for sceptical  considerations  about  foreign psyches.  The
human infant discovers the 2 pp or other humans as something special between the ages of 9
to  12  months.  This  is  important  for  the  development  of  morality  and  an  adequate
consciousness of self and ego too. During these months, the child realizes the other (usually
the mother) as a human person, distinct from other things and creatures, equipped with own
intentionality, norms and value.
The heterophenomenology suggested by Dennett implies the expansion of the concept 
of intersubjectivity to discussions about other intelligences. Given the different achievements 
of the species, it is absurd to compare chimpanzees with humans. They don’t have a human 
body (Leib) and corresponding human competences. While we have perhaps underestimated 
the mental competences of animals, nevertheless they don’t come close to human bodily 
competences. To restrict oneself to an atomization of mental states misses the real problem: 
namely the problem of human embodiment (Leiblichkeit) and the interpretation of that 
embodiment in the framework of a corresponding theory of subjectivity. 
A Robot behaves within a frame. An animal behaves within a frame of behavioural 
patterns. But Humans act inside a horizon. For this reason, it seems to me, the problem of 
intersubjectivity and heterophenomenology arises against the background of the perspectivity 
of human subjectivity. The question regarding perspectivity of human intersubjectivity 
constitutes the problem of horizon for human-embodied action. Competences have horizons; 
they are not constituted by omnipotence. The frame-problem in the context of a functionalistic
theory of representation needs to be questioned for its grounds through a phenomenological 
reduction. If we do this, we will see that active, perspectival and embodied personality 
designs its own emotional-mental horizons. Situated robotics is in need of programmed 
frameworks. These frameworks are given through technology and the technician. Abstractly 
speaking, the behaviour of the animal is determined by nature. But human action already calls
for greater active participation and has to be partially shaped by human itself.
Heterophenomenology, in a time of the technological superman, involves new 
dimensions. These are threefold: the heterophenomenology of other bodies (Leiber) (human 
intelligences), other living intelligences (organic intelligences, mostly in an animal manner), 
and other technical intelligences. The gradualism used here operates according to analogy. It 
involves other bodies (Leiber) in the sense of others, who are sensitive to pain. It is about 
other bodies (Leiber) in terms of the possession of emotions. And other bodies (Leiber) in 
terms of behaviour which can be modelled through simulations of action. The phenomenology
of the given, in terms of the subject taking place, needs to be separated from a 
phenomenology of the created.
The heterophenomenological perspective in terms of a transclassical phenomenology
allows three types of other intelligences:
(1) The other human being (with awareness of future and death and a model of self); 
human intelligence
(2) Other biological intelligences in terms of animals (with consciousness, and perhaps
self-consciousness); natural intelligence
(3) Autonomous operating machines (without a model of self and consciousness), 
artificial intelligence.
We  don’t  need  a  heterophenomenology  but  a  new hermeneutics  of  the  living,  of
nature, and of technology. Based on our embodied (leiblich) nature, we can allow animals and
things to speak. So a hermeneutics of other intelligences, of animals as well as of technology
or nature is absolutely necessary. The advance of human potentials for action will create new
changes in old values and also create new values. Therefore, humans create new matters of
fact.  But these new matters  of fact  alone do not  move values  forward,  but rather,  this  is
provided by interpretation. The unification of the laboratory and discourse is the way in which
science  proceeds.  The  constitution  of  the  lifeworld  (Lebenswelt)  happens  by  means  of
constant expansions with interpretations, valuations, discussions, conflicts and integration into
hierarchies and institutionalization. Collectives, as well as praxis and actions, are based on
acceptance. Lifeworlds and cultures are worlds we always take for granted, until we reflect on
them. 
On Interpretation of Natural Intelligences (Organic Intelligence)   
In many ways we have to be careful about the interpretation of animal behavior. We
must  first  decide,  which facts  are really  facts.  In  any case,  we assume a deep and close
connection  between  mental  states  and  behavior.  We  observe,  following  our  theoretical
arguments,  that  many  of  our  mental  states  are  correlates  of  characteristic  behavior.  We
observe  other  people  and  detect  the  same  features  of  behavior  or  patterns  of  behavior.
Therefore, we inductively presume that they are accompanied by various mental states. An
inductive argument based on just one case, allows no such generalization (Gertler, Shapiro
2007, 407-410). Even if chimpanzees can pass the mirror-test, there are substantial doubts that
they can identify mental states of others or even their own (Gertler, Shapiro 2007, 431). What
seems clear is that research has underestimated the whole field of implicit (tacit) knowledge
and competence in mammals, and even in humans. But humans generated implicit cultural
and strategic competences based on sensorimotor dexterity and technical competences and
handling of speech resulting from that dexterity. These implicit competences and knowledge
have no complement in the realm of the animals. Humans are more open and adaptive, but are
also more prone to illnesses and abnormal behavior. Already the surplus in tacit knowledge
and  competence,  incorporates  the  potentials  of  the  “homo  faber”  -  explicit  knowledge,
reflection  and self-reflection,  rationality  and freedom of  action  -  all  exclusively  count  as
specific human. Even what we consider as animalistic in our human nature, is specifically
human. This includes “homo technicus” as well. 
We have certain traits of tacit knowledge in common with animals. This includes even
potential self-knowledge. We have also implanted a part of our instrumental tacit knowledge
into  machines.  The  development  of  the  human  body  is  far  less  determined  by  genetic
dispositions than that of other biological organisms. Therefore in contrast to other creatures,
the  development  of  the  human  brain  and  competences  are  more  contingent  on  the
environment and hence more individualistic. These are first clues and aspects of freedom and
action-competence  (Handeln-Können)  in  humans.  It  seems  to  me  that  chimpanzees  have
varieties of mental states, but that they don’t build up the subjectivity of an embodied human
subject, with its extensive sensorimotor, linguistic and theoretical competences. An objection
against the so-called one-case-induction is that one achieves knowledge not based on one
case, but based on many states involved in the 1st person-perspective. This includes not only
mental states, but also the effects  of certain actions. Basically,  we need to accept that the
attributions of mental states, as well as the attributions of values, are just that: attributions and
not descriptions. We can’t describe the mental states of other humans, animals or machines.
We can only describe our own perceptions, not the ones we make available to others. Indeed,
there are good and plausible reasons for attributing human intelligence only to humans and
not to animals, and for denying this kind of intelligence when it comes to machines.
Thus,  animals  have non-human  minds  or  intelligences.  They may perhaps  possess
some kind of consciousness, some kind of intentionality and in part self-consciousness. Based
on  genetic  dispositions  and  instructions,  they  are  able  to  learn  certain  actions.  Machines
exhibit  a  non-human  mechanical  mind  without  conscious,  intentionality,  or  self-
consciousness.  They  can  behave  according  to  programming.  Compared  to  other  humans,
humans  exhibit  a  different  intentionality,  self-awareness,  fine  motor  skills  and  a  verbal
speech,  which  is  capable  of  abstraction,  graphical  representation  and  formalization.  It  is
important to locate the problem of other intelligences or other minds in the context of praxis.
“Intelligence” embedded in machines; embedded in biological organisms and embedded in
human  bodies  (Leiber)  is  always  something  different.  Animals  have  merely  a  1st-person-
perspective,  robots  have no  perspectivity.  Obviously,  the  human-animal-comparison  gives
support for the assumption, that human mind is a construct of interpretations. The human-
animal-comparison atomizes the characteristics and behavior and compares only particular
individuals. Instead the “thesis of handling” considers machines, animals and humans as a
whole. 
Handling of Artificial Intelligence: How Autonomous Can Robots Become?
The  basic  idea  of  the  agent  was  created  in  the  1950s.  John McCarthy’s  software
pioneered the underlying system,  but the term came to be used decades later,  at  the time
Apple developed the Knowledge Navigator in 1989. Agents are basically digital  valets  or
butler. The metaphor of the “butler” has turned out to be useful in this context. It’s a matter of
digital  butlers, Info-butlers and agents in man-shape. This visual metaphor is malleable. It
supersedes the simulation (Johnson 1997). The idea of agents, censors, zombies, which came
to  the  fore  in  the  AI,  replaced  philosophical  ideas  of  the  acting  “I”  (Ich)  with  a
conglomeration of pseudo-“I´s” and names. What is accomplished by this replacement? The
acting “I” is interpreted as a robot. The basis of the connectionist model in AI is a positivistic-
mechanistic and reductionistic model of the human mind. The question then emerges: Is there
a human thinking, which can escape embeddedness in the lifeworld? A thinking that is not
libidinously  emotionally  or  communicatively  embedded?  Such  a  thinking,  has  been
constituted in the application of our technologies. The construction of houses, temples, weir
systems  and  irrigation  systems  required  a  technical-constructive  thinking,  which  was
increasingly translatable to mathematics and typified the simulation of technical praxis. 
Many want to assign moral status to machines and their “actions”. As for humans it is
often vice versa. To epiphenomenalism the “will” is an epiphenomenon of neuronal activity.
Therefore the neural impulse generates two different effects: A mental and a physical effect,
an act of volition and physiological body movement. We mistake the will as cause of the body
movement (Zoglauer 1998). 
The delegation of the chain of means and ends to technical systems and machines 
leads to an instrumental reduction of the schemes of action (Handlungsschemata). Robots are 
upgraded machines, but they remain machines. There is no fundamental difference between 
an automatic loom and a humanoid robot. Robots which can act in an “autonomous” way, or 
more precisely, which in many situations act like an animal, remain technical products. They 
are mere tools and not acting subjects. The acting of a robot is a case of action without acting 
subject. The reproduction of technical schemes of action (Handlungsschemata) took place 
since the Industrial Revolution. There, with the replication of the spinning activity and 
connection of looms, the first reproduction of complex technical action occurred. Therefore, 
the modeling and simulation of human competence including tool-use isn’t something new. 
But indeed, what could be possible in robotics in the future, is extension of the basic schemata
to non-technical action-sequences, such as perception, mobility etc., which can be used for 
non-technical ends. With it, a further mechanization (Technisierung) of everyday life will take
place. But this is not a fundamental new fact (Irrgang 2008).  
The different levels of intelligence in humans and machines can be found in the fringe-
consciousness, to allow ambiguity, to differentiate between essential and non-essential aspects
and in the graspable composition. To find a plausible register of terms (Begriffsverzeichnis)
for just one domain is associated with enormous effort. The natural language shaped up as
more  complex  than  assumed.  Without  the  existence  of  a  global  context,  reciprocal
understanding is impossible. Insofar, a contextual frame is to be sought. This frame is the
shared culture. Human intelligence has the ability to unlock the sense of the words out of their
context.  Therefore  it  is  not  possible  to  analyze  human  behavior  as  a  mere  rule-guided
processing of a certain amount of elements (Dreyfus 1985, 154-173).
Very helpful  for  an understanding of  some issues  in  robotics  and AI is  Ricoeur’s
concept of action without an acting “I” (Ricoeur 1990, 73). Following Ricoeur, we have to
ask, whether robots are able to act and how we can evaluate the actions of robots. In the
framework of possible behavior patterns of a robot, it is undeniable that a robot in general can
fulfill  action-schemata  (Handlungsschema).  Action-schemata  in  general  meaning  is  given,
when intentionality and end of the action are shaped in advance. Furthermore, the idea of a
machinelike  action  should be introduced.  Afterwards,  machine-actions  and human actions
seem  determined.  Actions  which  at  first  seem not  to  follow  any  explicit  rules,  may  be
subsumed under a rule afterwards. Rules formulated in retrospect do not apply for the future
(Collins 1991). Robot-actions are a case of action without an acting subject. 
But the question is still open, of whether a machine could possess an awareness of its
own schematics of action through programming. We can’t assume this, because the types of
action performed by a certain computer should simulate human behavior as objective schemes
of  behavior  (3 PP).  The nature  of  the execution  (Vollzugsaspekt)  of a  human agent  or  a
human  scheme  of  action  can’t  be  simulated  in  a  machine,  because  it  is  a  first  person
perspective  (1  PP),  in  other  words,  the  perspective  of  the  execution.  There  may  be
comparability between the external aspects of human behavior and robot-behavior due to the
similarity  of  the  action-procedure  (Irrgang  2005a).  But  without  the  aspect  of  execution
(Vollzugsaspekt) given in 1 PP, one cannot speak of human action.
In the action-schemata meaning is given, when intentionality and end of action are
shaped in advance. For robots, the structure of action in terms of action-procedures and the
goal of action need to be programmed and created beforehand. Therefore an actual action-I
(Handlungs-Ich) is not necessary,  if there is a created goal-structure.  Thus the features of
action seen from the 3 PP can be given, without an acting I (1 PP). The goal-structure of an
action-schemata can be ethically assessed without an acting I (Ich). I can judge if a robot is
performing ethically positive or negative action-schemata. However, a non-embodied (nicht-
leiblich) action is action only in the abstract sense of the word, and whose consequences, the
programmer who created the action-schemata and implemented it is responsible, and not the
robot. Action itself is a construct of interpretation, a phenomenon of attribution. Viewed as
pure physical procedures (3 PP), actions don’t differ from events (Ereignisse). That’s why
positivists claim that moral action and human freedom don’t exist.  But our self-awareness
tells us the opposite (Irrgang 2005a). While the engineer makes it possible for the machine to
operate, by switching it on and off, or pausing and resuming operations (Irrgang 2005c), this
is much different from living bodily execution (leiblicher Vollzug).
Routine is operating according to a plan, innovative action involves acting for an end
not in the same way. Based on dispositions we acquire certain competences during action.
Already  existing  skills  are  being  updated,  extended  and  advanced.  The  handling-thesis
(Umgangsthese)  calls  for  a  phenomenological  conception  of  technological  artifacts  (i.e.
orientation towards surface-structures) and not a causal theory. The objective part of technical
competence- action-schemata- can be implemented into machines. Insofar, spinning machine
and weaving machine have been created through transfer of human patterns of manufacturing
into  mechanic  production.  Therefore  the  basis  of  technology  is  laws  of  nature  and  the
objectifiable  human  action  procedures  and  their  possible  implementation  into  technical
artifacts. The coping-mastery (Umgehen-Können) of machines, instruments and infrastructure
(with  its  measurable  results)  is  a  part  of  technical,  and  hence,  technological  praxis.
Technology  is  objectification  of  both  technical  coping-knowledge  (Umgangswisssen)  and
technical competence, the crosslinking of technical structures with modes of human-machine-
interaction. Robots as well as synthetic life-forms are consequent results of this technological
development.  Technological  understanding  and  natural  scientific  explanation  should  be
applied together, in the sense of “...as well as...” (sowohl-als-auch). Technical praxis is always
present  in  the  creative  process  of  construction,  invention  and  research.  For  a  general
technology, the object of investigation is the relation between technical routine and technical
innovation. The technical potential of an artifact is based on its inherent action-schemata. In
the case of the robot, an individualization of general technical operation-schemata takes place
(Irrgang 2008).
A formal action-structure of a robot or of its process sequence, detached from body
(Leib),  is  imaginable and maybe programmable.  The robot will  behave in  the frame of a
predetermined action-pattern (Handlungsmuster). A robot can’t give instructions to itself, but
is  bound to  a  given structure  of  instruction  due to  his  construction.  The “action”  is  pre-
interpreted through the style of programming. Robots don’t have “world”. They do not orient
themselves within the framework of human rationality, but within the framework of a given
action-frames  (Handlungsrahmen).  Ultimately  this  is  good,  because  AI  is  technical
intelligence.  Also  the  fact  that  there  is  a  limit  in  the  formalization  of  implicit  (tacit)
knowledge speaks against the assumption, that AI someday will achieve the status of natural
or  even  human  intelligence.  If  we  accept  the  limitations  of  technicality  we  don’t  lose
anything, except some of our prejudices.
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1ENDNOTE
 This paper is translated by Steffen Steinert, TU Dresden.
